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. Ail three of thèse thèmes underlie any attempt to rationalize Ontario's use of interest arbitration.
In simple terms, "sovereignty" stands for the notion that governments cannot accède to industrial action because to do so would compromise the sovereign authority to govern conferred on the législative body by the will of the people expressed by the ballot box. While it might be assumed that this notion has become an anachronism in an âge when governments hâve become the largest single employer in the economy and where the labour markets in which governments operate are structured so that no compétitive norm exists, it cannot be dismissed so easily in Ontario. Indeed, two gênerai inquiries of Ontario's public sector labour relations législation conducted at the end of the sixties placed considérable weight on this premise. In the
Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes (1968) Mr. Justice Rand observed:
The phenomenon in public service that is becoming clearer each day is the commitment of vital public functions to a rapidly increasing number of small minorities and the equally rapid expansion of community dependence on their faithful performance. When individuals or groups voluntarily undertake thèse responsibilities they enter a field of virtual monopoly; the community cannot secure itself against rejection of thèse responsibilities by maintaining a standby force which itself would be open to a similar freedom of action. Our society is built within a structure of interwoven trust, crédit and obligation; good faith and reliability are essential to its mode of living; and when thèse obligations are repudiated confusion may be the harbinger of social disintegration 2 .
Echoing thèse thoughts Judge Walter Little also questioned the wisdom of granting the strike right to Ontario's civil servants when he wrote: Furthermore, our démocratie processes provide the methods by which the interests of the community are to be safeguarded. We choose by free élections those who would be entrusted with that responsibility and we hâve the opportunity at regular intervais of either affirming that trust or transferring it to others. Implicit in the sélection of those who will govern us is the duty of those selected to provide, without interruption, those services to which ail citizens are entitled by law to avail themselves. Therefore, despite my opposition to the imposition of compulsory arbitration to settle industrial disputes in the private sector, I cannot accept the proposition that anyone who joins the public service, should hâve the right, in conjunction with others, to withdraw his services with the sole objective of compelling a duly elected government to meet their demands, no matter how meritorious they may be. To admit such proposition, is to imply that our processes of government, and the services which are provided by law for the benefit of ail citizens when required, can legally be rendered ineffectuai if a critical segment of public servants or crown employées should engage in strike action. The resuit of such enforced répudiation of its obligations to the community by the government could be, as stated by the late Honourable Mr. Rand, "the harbinger of social disintegration» 3 .
Taken to extrême, therefore, the sovereignty viewpoint suggests that every strike by government employées, regardless of the reason, is a political strike. However, in many situations the reality hardly corresponds with this perception. Even assuming that a strike against the government implicitly rejects extrême claims of sovereignty, it does not necessarily foliow that strikes by government employées are challenges to the political System. In the majority of instances, they are simply attempts to obtain the same kinds of improved wages, hours, and working conditions as those for which employées strike in the private sector; and, frequently, public service strikes should logically be a cause for much less concern that those in the private sector.
The "monopoly" argument is based on the related notion that most government services are offered on a monopolistic basis causing public sector trade unions to enjoy tremendous (and unfair) bargaining power when they threaten to strike. This view is more a tactical expression of the sovereignty argument put forward by Mr. Justice Rand. If it has merit, however, we should see public employée unions negotiating very favourable contracts and, yet, there is a substantial body of évidence that does not bear this out 4 . 2 Disputes, 1968 , p. 111. 3 Collective Bargaining in the Ontario Government Service, 1969 , p. 42. 4 See FEUILLE, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 1979 Nevertheless, where the government is the employer it should not be surprising that is has had difficulty minimizing this concern when acting in its rôle as labour relations policy maker. Indeed, when the expectations of a tax paying public to uninterrupted public services are combined with the spectre of a bargaining imbalance, one can see that policy making in public sector labour relations must be both courageous and altruistic.
Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour
Even assuming that the arguments of sovereignty and monopoly can be overcome, a concern that some or ail public employée strikes actually harm the innocent public or will after a certain duration remains as a final stumbling block to the mass importation of private sector principles to public sector labour relations. One need only list the thousands of employées providing policing, fire fighting and médical services to the public to throw up the spectre of possible catastrophe arising out of "selfish" différences over money. The "public policy" response takes mère seconds for formulation despite the fact that assertions of catastrophe are usually undocumented. In short, the emotional nature of the issue can mean that policy may be more rooted in editorial opinion and the rhetoric of political anxiety than in any thought-out attempt to harmonize the conflicting public interests of collective bargaining and public safety. Ail too often one suspects that the public interest in this aspect of labour relations is simply equated with the need for a guarantee against work stoppages. Compulsory interest arbitration, albeit imperfectly, represents this guarantee.
But I think it would be incorrect only to view interest arbitration as a process imposed on unwilling employées by narrow-minded governments on behalf of self-interested tax payers. As more and more expérience is gained with compulsory interest arbitration, it is becoming apparent that the institution is more than just an imperfect substitute for free collective bargaining. For example, the Government of Ontario is currently being lobbied by organized labour for the enactment of compulsory arbitration in first agreement bargaining situations. Ontario*s public health nurses are lobbying to be brought under The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act 5 and extended the right of compulsory arbitration. Indeed thèse two instances raise the gênerai policy issue of whether ail employées under private sector législation should be able to choose between strike action or interest arbitration in resolving their différences with employers -and, of course, vice versa. Professional engineers, having formed unions under the provisions of The Ontario Labour Relations Act 6 , are conducting seminars about the benefits of interest arbitration as a technique to résolve collective bargaining impasses. Access to interest arbitration in the private sector has been specifically provided for by amendments to The Labour Relations Act on the agreement of parties to a collective bargaining dispute. A number of teacher-schoolboard collective bargaining disputes hâve been striking teachers lobbying the Government or negotiating with the employer to end their strike by interest arbitration. One sees no massive campaign by Ontario's public servants, hospital employées, policemen or firemen against the compulsory arbitration that détermines their wages and other conditions of employment on an ongoing basis. In short, the process is nowhere near as unacceptable to employées as theory would suggest to be the case.
INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTEREST ARBITRATION
Any attempt to explain the patchwork application of interest arbitration in the Province of Ontario requires a brief review of the labour relations debate over the appropriateness of interest arbitration as an effective dispute resolution technique. Any inconclusiveness in the case against interest arbitration leaves room for the opération of the more philosophie or emotional perceptions of the strike right discussed above. This reality cannot be ignored. Moreover, as I review the particular expérience of Ontario with compulsory arbitration I want to refer back to the gênerai contours of this debate suggesting which expérience supports which argument.
Those who view compulsory interest arbitration as a very weak alternative to free collective bargaining marshal their arguments around the rôle of conflict in a labour relations system. One of the best statements of this rôle is found in the report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (1968) at para. 392 and following
:
There is a basic characteristic of the collective bargaining system that is seemingly contradictory. Paradoxical as it may appear, collective bargaining is designed to résolve conflict through conflict, or at least through the threat of conflict. It is an adversary system in which two basic issues must be resolved: How available revenue is to be divided, and how the clash between managements drive for productive efficiency and the workers quest for job, income and psychic security are to be reconciled. Other major différences, including personality conflicts, may appear from time to time but normally they prove subsidiary to thèse two overriding issues.
The Task Force went on to describe the rôle of économie conflict in functional terms arguing that the strike or lockout serves as a catalyst to agreement and as a catharsis for inévitable interpersonal workplace conflict.
Focussing on the weaknesses of compulsory arbitration as a substitute for économie conflict the Task Force observed:
One of the worst features of compulsory arbitration is its potentially corrosive effect on the decision-making process both within and between unions and management. It is natural that where both sides expect arbitration at the end of the line, should they fail to agrée, there will be a tendency to hold back a little for fear of establishing a new floor or ceiling for the arbitration. There will be an equal reluctance on both sides to concède anything lest it be something the arbitrator might force them to give in his award. Compulsory arbitration need not hâve thèse inhibiting effects on collective bargaining, but there is a real risk that it will, especially the longer and more often it is imposed.
Compulsory arbitration may also serve as a crutch for weak leadership in either union or management. When a union leader can force a dispute to arbitration he can avoid some of the compromises within the union and invariably go into a settlement. Instead of making the hard décisions about wage gains as against fringe benefits, across the board absolute as against percentage increases, skilled trade differentials, and other issues that can prove politically embarrassing, he can take ail internai conflicts to the arbitrator as demands and let him make the unpopular décisions. Similar évasion of responsibility can take place in management. Once a leader of any king finds an easy way out of some of his dilemmas, he is likely to behave in the same manner in other areas. In the long run the effect would be to undermine both the leadership in question and the collective bargaining process itself 8 . Of course, the opponents of interest arbitration do not end their attack at the potential corrosive and narcotic effects of the process. They go on to point out the inability of arbitrators to develop meaningful principles by which to adjudicate interest disputes. They argue that such disputes are inherently "polycentric" in nature with the resuit that arbitrators are unable to satisfy the parties that their interests hâve really been taken into account 9 . The "parasitic" criteria that tend to be relied upon are said to be inherently unstable and that, in any event, there are real limitations on the ability of an arbitration board to provide meaningful answers to complex labour relations problems. To this is added the risk that arbitration awards may hâve an adverse économie effect on the economy and the fact that the process does not effectively eliminate work stoppages. Indeed, it may, they suggest, exacerbate mid-term industrial relations conflict. Increasingly, however, others are arguing that the case against compulsory interest arbitration is more rhetoric than substance
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. Thèse observers suggest that the data on both the corrosive and narcotic effect of compulsory arbitration is at best arguable or tentative. They point out that the économie impact of compulsory arbitration appears to hâve been marginal
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. They also stress that award usage is in the 15 to 25 per cent area and does not seem to be increasing over time. (Although others hâve discovered a rising incidence of arbitration over 4 rounds of bargaining under the Public Service Staff Relations Act.) 12 Indeed, some proponents of interest arbitration point out that an effective System of compulsory arbitration has never been implemented in the sensé of establishing proper criteria and research capacity in an impartial agency responsible for the development of very detailed labour market and wage information. It is further argued that many of the imperfections of compulsory arbitration can be eliminated or at least modified by adopting particular forms of compulsory arbitration. For example, final offer sélection and "med-arb" are recommended as techniques designed to avoid or soften the so-called corrosive and narcotic impacts of compulsory arbitration 13 . Drawing back from the eut and thrust of this debate for a moment, it is apparent that both sides assume one monolithic industrial relations System. Compulsory interest arbitration is either right or wrong. This assumption ignores the fact that Canada is a politically diverse country reflecting ré-gional économie and social characteristics. And within each political jurisdiction labour-management relations consist of a multitude of industrial relations Systems
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. Fortunately, the constitutional allocation of responsibility for labour relations allows our country to accommodate the diverse political and régional interests in its labour relations laws, but within each jurisdiction there tends to be a drive towards the uniform application of laws, be they labour relations oriented or otherwise. This uniform approach, like our debate, ignores the fact that différent labour-management relationships react differently to compulsory arbitration schemes. Policemen and firemen are organized along paramilitary lines, and policemen, in particular, do not see their associations as part of the gênerai labour movement 15 . The acceptance of compulsory arbitration by thèse groups of employées belies many of the arguments just discussed. In fact, the very existence of compulsory interest arbitration in public sector labour relations laws may hâve attracted many white collar and professional employées to collective bargaining who would otherwise hâve been repelled from a "right to strike" brand of trade unionism. The growth in thèse latter occupations has been concentrated in the public sector and their appetite for interest arbitration is well documented and understood 16 . Adding more grey to the debate is the view that "free collective bargaining" in a modem economy is more contrived than real and that the proper management of our economy requires less individual freedom, not more. John Kenneth Galbraith, making the case for permanent wage and price control, has pointed oui: that the modem large corporation has extensive influence over its priées and over its costs. It supplies much of its capital from its own earnings. It strongly influences the tastes and behaviour of its consumers. He has therefore suggested that in this concentrated sector of the economy trade unions and employers are walking hand in glove and their joint détermination of wages and priées may be no more acceptable to employées and very much less consistent with the public interest than if the outeome was imposed by third party détermination 17 .
The more one looks at industrial relations in today's economy, the less one can distinguish where spécial public interest ends and normal private interest begins. In fact, there is a continuum of labour-management relations, some imbued with extrême public interest and, at the other end of the spectrum, those with little public significance. It has been observed that "where one begins and the other ends is a political question which, in part, will be determined by individual case and tirne 18 ." As a gênerai matter, however, there are at least seven principal areas which are usually considered to hâve inordinate public interest in that the disruption of service may threaten one or more of safety or health; necessary government; or the basic links of the economy. Thèse critical areas might be ranked in the foliowing order: police and firemen; hospitals and médical care; utilities; transportation; municipal services; civil servants; teachers and educational authorities.
What is interesting about Ontario is the uneven application of compulsory interest arbitration to thèse seven catégories of employées. Of the seven catégories, only three (police and firemen, hospitals, and civil servants) are covered by compulsory arbitration schemes. The other catégories enjoy free collective bargaining and in some cases hâve their own collective bargaining statute tailored to particular needs and bargaining history. On occasion, however, they too expérience the imposition of compulsory arbitration by way of ad hoc législation. Ontario therefore ranks neither as the most innovative nor as the least innovative in its utilization of interest arbitration. And like other jurisdictions, the uneven application of the process is as much a reflection of différent interest group pressures as it is a discriminating concern for the public's welfare and the theoretical dictâtes of labour-management relations.
ONTARIO'S USE OF INTEREST ARBITRATION
As of December 1979, 13.5% of employées working under provincial collective agreements were covered by agreements reached under laws requiring compulsory arbitration. The breakdown was as follows: under The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 66,700 employées covered in 558 agreements; under The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act, 56,100 employées in 10 agreements; under The Police Act, 14,600 employées in 141 agreements; under The Fire Departments Act, 7,700 employées in 78 agreements.
In 1978, 2,848 collective agreements were negotiated affecting 581,438 employées. Only 87 or 3% of thèse agreements were the resuit of compulsory arbitration, covering 16,201 or 2.8% of the total employées affected. In 1979, 5% of the total 3,309 agreements negotiated were the product of compulsory arbitration, affecting 8.4% of the total 600,044 employées involved. I also think it important to keep in mind the gênerai incidence of strike activity in Ontario against which should be compared the incidence of arbitration in any particular relationship. In 1975 (the A.I.B. year) 6.1 % of ail agreements were settled after a strike and thèse settlements applied to 15.2% of employées subject to settlements that year. In 1978 the figures were 3.7% and 5.5% respectively and in 1979 3.2% and 8.3%
19 .
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS
The collective bargaining system for police in Ontario is highly structured, but distinctly différent from the private sector system. Police work is concerned with a protection of persons, property and public order and therefore police employment disputes are settled by arbitration without stoppage of work. Members of police forces were specifically excluded from The Collective Bargaining Act, 1943 20 . In 1947, however, they were given the right to bargain with municipalities 21 . Excluding the Fédéral Royal Canadian Mounted Police, there are two types of police forces in Ontario; the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and the municipal police forces. The municipal police forces hâve jurisdiction within organized municipalities, while the OPP serves sparsely populated areas which do not hâve their own forces. Both the OPP and the municipal forces are regulated by The Police Act 22 and the régulations under it. Collective bargaining and arbitration procédures for municipal police are also established by this statute 23 , while The Public Service Act 24 which governs the Provincial Government's employées also applies to the OPP.
While it is true that police hâve enjoyed the right of free collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration since 1947 25 , Professor Harry Arthurs has observed that it was not until the émergence of strong police associations in Toronto and at the provincial level that thèse rights gathered real significance 26 . In the early 1960's both groups acquired full-time présidents and expanded staffs. This development went hand in hand with an increased awareness of the advantages of collective action among non-blue collar workers generally in Canada and over the last fifteen years collective bargaining between police associations and their employers has been pockmarked by confrontation and exhibits a heavy reliance on arbitration.
One of the most celebrated cases of récent vintage involved a request by the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association that ail uniformed patrol cars be manned by two fully trained and armed police officers while on patrol. While in previous awards arbitrators had adopted the view that this manning décision was a matter of judgment on the part of both commissioners and the heads of forces which should not be interfered with by an arbitra-20 S. O. 1943, c. 4 . The issue and subséquent arbitral responses reflect the dramatic impact that compulsory arbitration can hâve upon public policy and the allocation of public funds. The issue also reveals how collective bargaining, in the context of compulsory arbitration, can become insulated from other policy considérations making claims on scarce public monies. Where employées make claims by way of free collective bargaining, other interest groups in need of public funds can at least indirectly participate through the gênerai budgetary process and lobbying. The employer has to balance thèse conflicting claims in cushioning his position both at the bargaining table and in the political arena. Employées, therefore, hâve no absolute right to hâve their claims met and are confronted with the employées dilemma of a limited pool of money on which many demands are being made in addition to those of collective bargaining. On the other hand, none of thèse other interest groups hâve standing before an interest arbitrator and arbitration awards are usually made, as we will see, without regard for the public employer's ability to pay. The Metropolitan Toronto two-man patrol car case also brings into serious question the appropriateness of policy-making in a relative vacuum of factual information. Adjudication is not a decision-making process best suited to solving highly complex polycentric problems 28 . Indeed, the full complexity of the issue and its suitability to interest arbitration is best seen from the next arbitration award to deal with it 29 .
The second arbitrator was advised by the parties that the Commission's case against the two officer car System was the most thorough analysis of the issue ever presented to an arbitrator. A large part of the Commission^ évidence comprised of reports of various bodies and persons who had studied the issue in the past culminating in a 1976 study prepared by Robin D. Haie for the Board of Police Commissioners for the Régional Municipality of Waterloo entitled "Two Man Police Cars: Logic or Emotion." The Commission also produced extensive évidence on the exceptionally sophisticated radio communications network which it had commissioned and installed, at least in part to ensure that police officers answering a call where the possibility of danger was great would receive rapid support from other units. Radio calls for police services were analyzed for each patrol district. Current statistics were also reviewed. The Commission also adduc-27 See Metropolitan Toronto Police Association, unreported, George S. P. FERGUSON, April 19, 1974 . This award was upheld as a proper élaboration of the term "working condition" found in section 29 (2) ed évidence of the considérable dislocation of forces caused by the changeover. Such important services as the York Bureau, the Crime Prévention Bureau, the Community Relations Branch and several others were decimated in the massive reassignment of personnel necessary to meet the requirements of the earlier Ferguson award. A drastic réduction of officers assigned to downtown foot patrol duty was necessary as well. There was also some évidence that a gênerai shortage of personnel had resulted in a significant number of delays in responding to some calls for police service by patrol units. On the other hand, the Association's case was based on the primary issue of safety. It pointed in particular to the murder of a number of police officers in Metropolitan Toronto and indicated that the availability of a backup officer, armed and fully trained, might hâve saved the life of the victim of some attacks. In attempting to balance ail of thèse considérations the arbitrator wrote (at pages 23 to 27):
In the event, the task of balancing those two legitimate interests falls, in the absence of a negotiated settlement, to me in nearly the same form as it fell to Judge Ferguson in 1974. The method he used to résolve the problem was and I say with no disrespect a blunt instrument. Unfortunately, the armory of an arbitrator as I hâve indicated above, contains little else to deal with complex and many faceted problems. The expérience of implementation in the 1974 award and the very full évidence available to me makes it possible for me to do some fine tuning, but I am painfully aware that any award I make will be inadéquate to meet ail of the valid considérations involved. My jurisdiction requires me to détermine the présent issue, however, and there is no other method of resolution available.
I hâve therefore determined to confirm the principle of the 1974 award, but to adjust its opéra-tion to respond more closely to the period when the combination of heightened criminal activity, movement about the area by citizens and the complicating factor of darkness combined to place the greatest demand on police services and to increase the chances of a police officer being involved in a dangerous situation with no assistance readily available. In addition, I hâve determined that it would be proper to restrict somewhat the meaning of "patrol cars" in the 1974 award. The évidence is that, although there was originally some doubt, the parties treated that phrase (at the insistence of the Association) as including cars assigned to traffic patrol duty as well. In the view I hâve taken of the évidence of the safety factor, inclusion of thèse cars in my award would not be appropriate. There hâve been no homicidal attacks on traffic officers, and it would seem unlikely that the sort of unpredictable attacks which might occur would be prevented by having two officers in a car. It is true that traffic officers do some patrol duties and that they will be called upon to backup patrol officers, but in thèse cases the police procédures described above should provide protection as sure as two officer cars would. As their patrol activities would be only supplemental to the duties of the patrol area units, the spécifie problem of the increased risk during the peak period ought not to affect thèse officers. There was évidence of the accidentai death of a traffic officer left alone at an accident scène. While I agrée that there ought to hâve been another officer présent, I cannot see that it would make any différence whether that officer arrived in the same or another car. I therefore award that: "Ail uniform patrol cars, except those assigned to traffic duties, shall be manned by two fully trained and armed police officers while on patrol between the hours of 4:00 p.m. one day and 4:00 a.m. the following day, or during such other continuous period of twelve houirs per day as shall be designated by the Commission to coincide with the period of peak patrol activity. This change shall be fully implemented within a period of ninety days from the date of this award." Most arbitral reasoning is based on comparable standards -what is happening elsewhere. In this sensé it is an inherently conservative process. By définition, problems of first considération often lack any comparable standard. In such situations, therefore, is an arbitrator justified and suited to engage in a form of social engineering? Ought he or she to be innovative? What is innovative for one party can be absolutely disastrous for another. Moreover, innovation is often in the eye of the beholder. An innovative solution by a very conservative adjudicator may not be what employée représentatives hâve in mind when they demand greater arbitral courage in this respect. On the other hand, in a "closed" System like police bargaining an adjudicator has no real choice unless prepared to simply say "No". Finally, I turned to the question of relativities with other groups of employées in other types of employment. This comparison may be the most dif ficult of ail to make, and the parties set out a number of alternative approaches. The Association suggested, through Mr. Brown, a "link" whereby police salaries would be fixed to a set proportion of some other identifiable employée group and would follow the progress of that group in lock step; the basis of the proposai is the British Royal Commission on the Police, 1960 (Cmnd 1222) which proposed a direct link to the skilled trades. "Links" hâve been popular in Great Britain, where pay research methods hâve been carefully developed in the context of national bargaining patterns, but they hâve been very short-lived in Canada, even when successful. The long-standing, but now apparently defunct link between teachers in British Columbia and workers in the forest industry is a good example. Another approach, advanced by Professor Lightman, was a form of qualitative job évaluation where the éléments of that technique were used to describe the différences in the work of various comparable occupations without the quantitative data which the technique is normally used to collect. Although I accept the bases of comparison he advances as relevant, I am of the view, as he himself observed, that the analysis is somewhat subjective.
"Reasonable people can reasonably disagree on the criteria selected on the particular comparisons to be made and on the détails of thèse comparisons."
There are any number of policing jobs, and a composite picture of the police off icer for the purposes of salary détermination ought to be quantitatively based, so that appropriate weight is given to the factors which count highest in a job évaluation program, if a reliable resuit is to be produced.
Parasitic wage criteria are criteria that dérive their sustenance from another bargaining process 33 . In relying on such criteria, care must always be taken not to use parasitic criteria that will in time undermine the very foundations of the adjudicative process. The real problem in police and fire wage déterminations generally is their potential for devouring the very basis of adjudication. In Ontario police and fire arbitrations there is increasing évidence that the System is doing just this. Ail of the critical comparisons are centered on the expérience of a few key bargaining situations and they lack stable outside comparisons. The entire System, therefore, rests on a foundation of shifting sand.
AD HOC INTERVENTION
Canadian constitutional law views municipal corporations as the cré-atures of statute; they possess neither inhérent powers nor sovereign status. Accordingly, in the absence of a spécifie exclusionary provision, municipalities fall within the ambit of a gênerai labour relations statute. By the mid i960's municipal labour relations had been brought under private sector législation in almost every Canadian province, including Ontario. There are no prohibitions on the right of Ontario municipal employées to strike, other than the gênerai requirement that the conciliation procédure provided by The Labour Relations Act be exhausted. And on several occasions in ré-cent years this right has been exercised, as for example in 1966, 1968 and 1972 when City of Toronto outside workers struck. Although thèse strikes potentially pose a serious threat to the community, since the employées in-33 Ibid., at p. 15.
volved include garbage men and operators of the sewage and water supply Systems, in fact no danger has ensued. On only one occasion has the Ontario Government actually intervened, by ad hoc législation, to require compulsory arbitration of a threatened strike of municipal hydro-electric employées 34 .
The gênerai model followed by the Ontario Législature in ordering employées back to work on an ad hoc basis is to dictate some minimum percentage increase in wages effective immediately on the employées return to work, a technique apparently intended to insure co-operation and instill some confidence in the arbitration process. The arbitrator is then given jurisdiction to award any further or additional increase in compensation he thinks justified in the circumstances. Ad hoc législation is a dangerous business: It invites politicization of disputes; it changes the rules in the middle of the game -and is thus liable to be challenged on grounds of basic fairness; and does not afford the parties or the government any long term basis for resolution of difficult, structural problems. Moreover, for a government which generally looks to labour for support, reliance upon ad hoc législation may simply not be a realistic possibility 37 .
It might also be added that the risk of ad hoc législation can cast a long shadow over public interest bargaining which more scapel-like permanent législation avoids. 
THE HOSPITAL LABOUR DISPUTES ARBITRATION ACT
The principle underlying collective bargaining in the public hospital sector is that each hospital is an autonomous unit responsible for signing and complying with the terms of a collective agreement. Bargaining entered into by a hospital on a group or province-wide basis is entirely voluntary; but, nevertheless, the historical development of bargaining in the hospital industry in Ontario reflects an appetite for wider area and, in some cases, province-wide bargaining. A number of factors hâve caused this resuit.
Originally labour-management relations in this sector were covered by The Labour Relations Act with the right to strike. And at that time, nurses and paramédical staff were virtually non-union. The only hospital employées organized into unions in any significant degree were service groups comprised of dietary, housekeeping, laundry, maintenance and stationary engineering employées. Indeed, many hospitals had no unions whatsoever.
But in 1965 The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act
n was enacted to protect the community from disruptions in the delivery of health care following the first strike in hospital bargaining at Trenton Mémorial Hospital. The législation applies to both public hospitals and nursing homes and homes for the aged.
While many might view this législation as very restrictive, it is interesting to note that is also changed the climate for union organization of hospital workers and the financial ability of unions to launch organizing campaigns for new members. Statistics suggest that the newly found funds unions received from compulsory dues conditions awarded by arbitrators (that the hospitals had previously refused to concède), coupled with the élimination of any risk to employées of being called out on strike, led to considérable union success in organizing hospital units. As well, the Registered Nurses Association of Ontario support of nursing groups interested in collective bargaining rapidly led to the certification of many nursing bargaining units across the province 39 . Many technician and technologist groups also organized for collective bargaining and greatly increased the number of separate bargaining groups in the hospital field. The rapid escalation in the number of employées organized and the prolifération of separate bargaining units created, at least from the employers' viewpoint, whipsawing and leapfrogging pressures both within the hospitals and between hospitals. As each agreement was settled, either directly or by arbitration, it created a new plateau or floor for other negotiations related either geographically or by job similarity. In addition to thèse direct monetary costs, the numerous negotiations caused the collective bargaining expenses of both parties to rise sharply over this period. negotiation procédures by reducing the bargaining groups to three; service, nursing and paramédical. The Commission also supported province-wide negotiations on central matters with local issues being left for settlement within each hospital. The Commission's view was that the parties should work towards a System of province-wide bargaining on a voluntary basis rather than having the System imposed through législation and it recommended that the bargaining agents work toward the goal of bargaining by way of a council of trade unions. However, the Commission stated that if the unions could not reach this goal voluntarily then it should be legislated. Since the publication of the Johnston Report the parties hâve engaged in wider area bargaining and when impasses hâve necessitated compulsory arbitration, one or two arbitration awards hâve set the pattern for the entire industry whether by agreement of the parties at the outset of the arbitration or as a resuit of de facto collective bargaining pressures subséquent to the handing down of the award. Thus, while in 1976 it was reported that only 3% of ail the agreements arrived at in hospital bargaining were the product of compulsory arbitration, it must be noted that the other 97% of thèse settlements designated as non-arbitrated were based almost completely on the few arbitrated agreements during that period. Thus, incidence of arbitration statistics provide a deceptive picture of the real impact of compulsory arbitration in hospital collective bargaining in Ontario
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. Nevertheless, even when only arbitration incidence statistics are examined one does observe a discernable trend to greater reliance upon direct third party intervention. In 1976 we noted that only 3% of employées were directly subject to a compulsory arbitration award. In 1977 the number of employées increased to 16%. In 1978 Ontario experienced a dramatic increase in compulsory arbitration affecting 69% of ail employées subject to collective bargaining that year and in 1979 48% of ail hospital employées engaging in collective bargaining were subject to a compulsory arbitration award 42 . Thèse statistics tend to bear out the corrosive and narcotic effect of compulsory arbitration. It is also undisputable that the incidence of compulsory interest arbitration is much greater than the incidence of agreements arising out of work stoppages or strike activity. (See page 16 herein.)
From the very inception of the législation the extent to which bargaining parties in hospitals reached voluntary agreements has tended to décline. A study published in 1970, looking at the first five years of opération of the législation, reported that in the two years prior to the législation, approximately one-half of ail settlements were made at the pre-conciliation bargaining stage and one quarter at the conciliation officers stage. Of the remaining 25%, half were settled by conciliation boards and half in postconciliation bargaining. Only two strikes occurred 43 . When the Act came into effect, the proportion of non-voluntary agreements increased resulting in a greater incidence of arbitration awards than the previous incidence of strikes. Between August lst, 1965 and July 31st, 1970 the number of ar-bitration awards per year grew from 13 to 39. In relative terms the growth in awards was less pronounced going from 15% of ail settlements to 25%. However, since arbitration was introduced there appears to hâve been a gênerai décline in the willingness of the parties to reach voluntary agreement, especially since mid-1969. Indeed, many of the issues presented to hospital arbitrators would never be strike issues in private sector collective bargaining, suggesting an unwillingness to make tough bargaining décisions or a ploy of leaving something for the arbitrator to "split the différence" with.
Compulsory arbitration under the Hospital Disputes Arbitration Act 44
has provided the greatest expérience with interest arbitration criteria in Ontario. No criteria for the decision-making function of compulsory arbitration boards is outlined in the statute. In the first arbitration in 1965, the arbitrator, Prof essor H.W. Arthurs, adopted the approach that the arbitration process should try to corne as close to producing what free collective bargaining would hâve produced as possible. Accordingly, he provided the following list of items which he felt might provide adéquate guidelines to the adjudicative rôle he had accorded to hospital arbitrations awards 45 . 1) Wages paid in "comparable hospitals", i.e. those of similar type in communities enjoying a similar cost of living and average wage level. 2) Trends in cost of living and average wages in the locality where the hospital is located. 3) Trends in comparable hospitals. Of lesser weight, but also of importance were: 1) Difficulties encoutered by the hospital in recruiting and holding staff (some évidence of the hospital's failure to pay a level of wages high enough to attract workers on a local labour market). 2) Trends in non-comparable hospitals and in non-hospital occupations. 3) Trends in hospital wages generally.
Professor Arthurs then went on to say that little weight should be given to wage levels in non-comparable hospitals, wages in non-hospital occupations, and abstract appeals to justice. Unfortunately, as compulsory arbitration began to rely on voluntary made bargains that were comparable within the parameters of thèse criteria and such bargains were in turn based on the results of compulsory arbitration, a circular kind of reasoning began to undermine the integrity of the process. This reality caused boards of arbitration to begin to hâve regard to negotiations outside hospitals which were truly free of the distorting effects of compulsory arbitration. In the Peel Mémorial Hospital case 46 Professor Weiler made this point in writing:
After a time the arbitration décisions themselves become a major factor in determining the kinds of settlements which will be agreed to. With the relative uncertainty of a strike replaced 44 R.S.O. 1970 , c. 208, s. 4. 45 Welland County Hospital, 1965 , 16 L.A.C. 1. 46 1969 by more predictable patterns in arbitration awards, the level of private agreement will tend to reflect the trends in the awards. If this is the case, one complètes the vicious circle if the awards are themselves justified by patterns of wages arrived at by settlement. It is no longer possible as it was in the earlier décisions, to extrapolate from the status quo before the Act. Arbitrators must begin to hâve référence to negotiations outside hospitals which are truly free of the distorting effects of compulsory arbitration.
In an award involving the Toronto Wellesley Hospital in 1976, the arbitrator, Kevin M. Burkett, generalized this approach as it had developed in writing that equity in compulsory arbitration must flow from "community compensation standards*'
47
. It was stated that if the tax paying public déter-mines that it requires an uninterrupted service then it must be prepared to pay those who provide the service compensation commensurate with community standards 48 . Such standards were to be determined on the évidence by establishing a relationship between those affected by the adjudication and other jobs which reflected community compensation standards. However, the approach assumes the existence of constant and rational links between the private and public sectors and in many situations this assumption is highly debatable. Community compensation standards or parasitic criteria may be acceptable on one occasion because the resuit is acceptable. But when conditions change, their acceptability can be put into question. A good example of this lack of stability can be seen on the very next attempt to apply the Wellesley Hospital rationale.
The Wellesley Hospital board of arbitration was dealing with the compensation of registered nurses and in choosing a community standard the board chose the surrogate relationship between registered nursing assistants and registered nurses. This internai relationship was chosen because the registered nursing assistants had already settled with the hospitals and there appeared to be a historical relationship between the compensation of R.N.A.'s and R.N.'s during the previous two years of province-wide bargaining. The board reasoned that, first, a registered nursing assistant belonged to the same work group as a registered nurse; second, registered nursing assistants were members of a service unit which included classifications found in the private sector and hence the assumption of an indirect or parasitic relationship for R.N.'s with the private sector; third, registered nursing assistants were covered by a collective agreement extending to March 31st, 1978; and fourth, there was évidence before the board which established the existence of a historical differential of 74% to 75% between the start rates for the registered nursing assistant and registered nurse. In fact, on the basis of weighted average monthly rates, the parties themselves negotiated a differential of just under 75% for the 1975 calendar years.
Unfortunately, however, this approach had the effect of determining the compensation of more highly paid nurses by the compensation paid to lesser qualified and lesser paid registered nursing assistants where the wages of the registered nursing assistants were settled or determined first. In the next round of bargaining for nurses this is exactly what happened and the nurses found the ONA settlement to be totally unacceptable in terms of the resuit that would be generated for them. With a key interest arbitration for nurses scheduled in June of 1979, the hospitals settled in March with the S.E.I.U. for 43 hospitals -a negotiated settlement affecting 8,100 service workers including the registered nursing assistants. This settlement was somewhere in the order of 5.6% annually and it was the first major settlement of the year in the hospital sector. It was also somewhat out of tune with annual base wage rate increases in Ontario manufacturing which were at about 7.6% and with the rate of inflation. Thus, in the June arbitration dealing with the nurses the employers requested Professor Swan, the arbitrator, to rely exclusively upon the settlement between 8,100 service workers in determining the gênerai wage increase for over 18,000 nurses and relied heavily on the Wellesley Hospital award rationale of Arbitrator Burkett. In refusing to do so and thereby rejecting the "historical" 75% relationship between R.N.A.'s and R.N.'s, Professor Swan wrote:
There are, however, other factors which ought to be taken into considération in deciding whether this board can accept the S.E.I.U. settlement as an ironclad indicator of the appropriate salary range for registered nurses. First, and most important, the S.E.I.U. agreement covers only the 43 hospitals, whereas our award will, by virtue of the application of the "province-wide reality" to which we hâve referred above, cover some 133 hospitals. Another S.E.I.U. local in now at arbitration, and another major bargaining agent, the Canadian Union of Public Employées, is still negotiating for the registered nursing assistants which it represents and the rest of the hospitals to which we must hâve référence. There is no sign that the S.E.I.U. settlement will lead to an immédiate replication of the terms of that settlement for R.N.A.'s elsewhere. It seems, therefore, that the circumstances which face the Wellesley Hospital arbitrators, in which most of the bargaining which would provide data for an internai comparisons study was completed are not those which face us at the présent time 49 .
The rest of the award, however, serves to demonstrate how imprécise criteria can be when arbitrating without the benefit of a key determining settlement and few arbitration awards which hâve attempted to reach beyond the isolated search for a comparable community standard hâve fared better
50
. One récent and important attempt to give some order to interest arbitration decision-making was undertaken by arbitrator Shime in British Columbia Railway Company and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employées, Caribou Lodge, 221 et al. (1977) 51 . In that case he outlined a complex of additional considérations that any interest dispute adjudicator should take into account. They included: 49 Kingston General Hospital, unreported, Kenneth P. SWAN, June 12, 1979, at pp. 22-23. 50 Also see K.P. SWAN, Criteria In Interest Arbitration, 1978. 51 Cited and reviewed in York Régional Board of Health, 1978, 18 L. A.C. (2d) 255, at p. 267.
1. Public sector employées should not be required to subsidize the community by accepting sub-standard wages and working conditions. 2. Cost of living. 3. Productivity. 4. Comparisons (a) internai, (b) (i) external -in the same industry, (ii) external -not in the same industry but similar work. The most comprehensive attempt to develop a meaningful set of criteria and procédures for compulsory arbitration in Ontario is found in the Johnston Commission Report referred to above. The Commission recommended that the following criteria should be used in the seulement of terms and conditions of employment in collective agreements in public hospitals in Ontario:
The need to ascertain and préserve appropriate relationships in the conditions of employment (a) as between occupations in public hospitals and (b) as compared to similar occupations outside the public hospitals with due regard for the labour market areas specified in appropriate législation 52 .
Thèse criteria were to be embodied in The Hospital Labour Disputes Act and accorded equal weight by arbitrators. For the successful application of the first recommended criterion, the Commission recommended that a comprehensive and dependable job évaluation System be established. To achieve external comparability and to link hospitals with the private sector, the Commission recommended agreement between the parties on a set of benchmark occupations which were easily compared from establishment to establishment, i.e. cleaner, switchboard operator, stationary engineer and electrician. By negotiating compensation for such benchmarks, the parties to hospital bargaining were to be able to obtain settlements which reflected those in the private sector. Having negotiated the changes in benefits for the benchmark occupations, it was then thought to be a simple task to apply thèse increases to ail other occupations in public hospitals in accordance with the relationships established by the proposed job évaluation system. However, the Commission went on to note that if external comparisons were to be meaningfully applied as criteria for setting hospital compensation, it was important to establish explicit labour market boundaries that were broad enough to afford a sufficient number of external comparisons. After examining statistical data by way of a job matching survey, the Commission was satisfied that in any area the size of one of the ten économie régions of Ontario or one of the 14 Ontario Hospital Association districts, an abundance of good external job matches could be found across a broad cross section of industries. In other words, the Commission did not see compulsory arbitration as leading to uniform wage rates across the Province. Finally, the Johnston Commission took the position that a resource centre to provide proper statistical information was necessary for the successful réhabilitation of compulsory arbitration in public hospitals. In the Commission^ view, if arbitrators were to base awards on the criterion of extemal comparability they must hâve access to reliable, independent and up-to-date comparative data on wages and benefits. In the absence of a pay research agency, the Commission was highly skeptical that the proposée! législative criteria would improve the performance of compulsory arbitration. It thought the absence of reliable outside comparisons would simply increase the risk of highly controversial décisions based on inadéquate information. However, to date, thèse recommendations hâve not been acted upon.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF ONTARIO

The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act
53
, provides for the compulsory arbitration of interest disputes involving civil servants. Section 3(2) of that Act provides that certain "bargaining units designated in the régulations are appropriate units for collective bargaining". Ontario Reg. 577/72, section 11, in effect establishes one large residual bargaining unit which embraces most provincial government employées who are entitled to collective bargaining. The Ontario Public Service Employées Union (O.P.S.E.U.) holds the bargaining rights for approximately 52,000 employées who fall within this massive bargaining unit -a unit which bears no resemblance to any other unit ail of which are much smaller and more homogenous 54 . In order to couteract the adverse effects of bargaining size the parties, early on and by agreement, began to bargain separately for each of five broad occupational catégories. They also made a distinction between benefits and working conditions and hâve negotiated each separately. In effect, the parties hâve thereby maintained uniformity in respect of benefits and other conditions of employment while establishing eight catégories or bargaining groups, each of which negotiates separately in respect of salary scales.
Section 6 and 17(1) of the statute authorizes an employée bargaining organization to represent employées on spécifie terms and conditions of employment while excluding many others. Section 17(1) provides that every collective agreement shall be deemed to pro vide that it is the exclusive... function of the employer to manage and manage is defined to include: (a) employment, appointment, complément, organization, assignment, discipline, dismissal, suspension, work methods and procédures, kinds and locations of equipment and classification of positions; and (b) a merit System, training and development, appraisal and super annuation, the governing principles of which are subject to review by the employer with the bargaining agent. The provision goes on to specifically provide that such matters will not be the subject of collective bargaining nor will they corne within the jurisdiction of a board of arbitration. 53 S.O. 1972 , c. 135, s. 9, as amended by S.O. 1974 , c. 135, s. 4. 54 See ARTHURS, op. cit., note 15 at p. 111. 55 S.O. 1972 .
The Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act
55
, in contrast to the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, sets out guidelines or criteria that a board of arbitration shall consider relevant in resolving matters in dispute. However, the criteria are extremely gênerai and hâve provided no greater measure of predictability to the process. Thèse criteria take the following form 56 : (a) the needs of the crown and its agencies for qualified employées; (b) the conditions of employment in similar occupations outside the public service, including such géographie, industrial or other variations as the board may consider relevant; (c) the desirability to maintain appropriate relationships in the conditions of employment as between classifications of employées; and (d) the need to establish terms and conditions of employment that are fair and reasonable in relation to the qualifications required, the work performed, the responsibility assumed and the nature of the services rendered. Unfortunately, there is no independent pay research body for Ontario public service bargaining to provide detailed and acceptable data. Therefore, the union and Government each hâve developed différent statistical gathering procédures, although when benchmark jobs are negotiated, they normally agrée upon a list of spécifie classifications and the number of employées in those classifications. Prof essor Arthurs has suggested that the différences in research material used by the parties may contribute to their failure to reach agreements 57 . Related difficulties hâve arisen from the parties' différent interprétations of the same facts and the différences in value placed upon such factors as mobility and security of tenure. Possibly some of thèse différences could be resolved by the establishment of an independent pay research bureau supported by both parties as exists at the fédéral level. However, neither party seems particularly interested in seeking an independent bureau, both apparently taking the view that data and information supplied by a neutral agency would be subject to différent interpréta-tions in any event.
Statistics on the incidence of interest arbitration indicate a substantial dependence on the process. For example, in 1977 approximately 48% of ail employées were subject to an arbitrated seulement and in 1978 some 25% of provincial employées were subject to arbitration. But in 1979 negotiations were very successful and 97% of ail employées negotiating during that year were covered by non-arbitrated settlements. Overall, since 1963 when bargaining began, there hâve been 64 sets of negotiations; 29 hâve resulted in agreements achieved in direct negotiations; 15 hâve involved seulement at the médiation stage; and 20 or approximately 30% hâve gone to compulsory arbitration 58 . There is therefore a substantial reliance upon the interest arbitration process and an examination of some of thèse awards reveals that by the time the parties get to the arbitrator they are often very far apart. 56 S.O. 1972, c. 67, c. 11(2) , as amended by S. O. 1974, c. 135, s. 7. 57 See ARTHURS, op. cit., note 15 at p. 117. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any overall discontent with the System. Although the O.P.S.E.U. has recently affiliated with the Ontario Fédération of Labour and the most récent brief of the Ontario Fédération of Labour to Government recommends that the right to strike be extended to Ontario's public servants, real employée interest in such a right is very debatable. But this is not to say that labour relations in Ontario's public service has always been tranquil. In 1974 an unlawful strike was threatened by the operating catégories of civil servants in respect to which the Government responded with an offer of over 21% for one year. This situation and a similar incident involving hospital nurses suggest that in a highly bureaucratized collective bargaining structure real change seems to march hand in hand with crisis and confrontation. In order to achieve this crisis pitch in collective bargaining disputes must be elevated to the level of highly-charged and politicized confrontations. By the same token, in order to get law-abiding public servants to threaten an unlawful strike collective bargaining issues hâve to be converted into moral principles worthy of such action, a resuit which is really a négation of the ordinary collective bargaining process. From an impasse resolution point of view, the most important feature of the Act is the teachers' right to strike. At the request of both teacher and trustée organizations, the Government granted the teachers the right to strike. A strike is defined to include a work-to-rule, mass résignations, and the withdrawal of services. The Act also permits a board to respond to strike action by locking out the teachers and closing the schools. However, before strike action can be taken, the fact-finding process prescribed by the Act must be followed, and the Commission must supervise votes of the branch affiliâtes both on the last offer received from the board and on whether the members favour strike action. The branch affiliate must also give the board at least five days notice prior to strike action. Finally, the Act specifically provides for the voluntary adoption by the parties of either conventional interest arbitration or final offer sélection, which means that at any time during the negotiating process the parties, on mutual agreement, can opt for one of thèse two other ways provided by statute to résolve their différences.
Neither under
The Education Relations Commission (E.R.C.) is composed of five persons appointed by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council. It was established to supervise and co-ordinate the collective bargaining process as well as to provide a bu ffer between the political and the collective bargaining processes. The E.R.C. functions include:
(a) to maintain an awareness of negotiations between teachers and boards; (b) to compile statistical information on the supply, distribution, professional activities and salaries of teachers; (c) to provide such assistance to the parties as may facilitate the making or renewing of agreements; (d) to sélect and where necessary to train persons who may act as mediators, fact finders, arbitrators or selectors; (e) to détermine at the request of every party or in the exercise of its discré-tion whether or not either of the parties is or was negotiating in good faith and making every reasonable effort to make or renew an agreement; (0 to détermine the matter of évaluation and to supervise votes by secret ballot pur suant to the Act; and (g) to advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council when, in the opinion of the Commission, the continuance of the strike, lockout or closing of a school or schools will place in jeopardy the successful completion of courses of study by the students affected by the strike, lockout or closing of the school or schools.
Since the inception of the Act there hâve been 997 bargaining situations. In only 29 cases has a strike occurred and in 47 situations the parties hâve opted for interest arbitration. Thus, arbitration has been mutually resorted to more often than économie action and the overwhelming majority of negotiations hâve been settled without the need for either terminal event. The results of final offer sélection, where adopted, hâve been closely studied on occasion 61 . The indications are that final offer sélection (F.O.S.) works best when it is agreed to as the method of dispute resolution from the outset of bargaining, thereby generating the kind of pressures for reasonableness encouraged by potential économie conflict. It has also been pointed out that while issue-for-issue final offer sélection avoids the possibility of an arbitrator having to choose between two unreasonable contract proposais, it does not generate the same kind of pressures that help avoid the need to go to arbitration in the first place. The expérience has also been that F.O.S. is less expensive and more expeditious than conventional interest arbitration. I assume this results from the capacity of the parties to télescope their présentations in respect of the justification of a single package configuration. F.O.S, also stresses overall reasonableness as the prééminent criterion for sélection and thus encourages parties to keep this factor in mind throughout their collective bargaining relationship. A final important feature of F.O.S. is that it apparently reduces the absolute number of issues that need to be arbitrated in any particular situation.
One of the most significant interest arbitration awards handed down in teacher board bargaining, albeit it was legislated on an ad hoc basis, arose out of the Métro Toronto school teachers' strike in 1975. This was the first major strike testing the législation. After the strike had been in progress for some six weeks, the E.R.C. assigned a three-man médiation team to attempt a resolution but the team*s efforts failed. Mr. Justice Dubin of the Ontario Court of Appeal was then appointed to adjudicate the matters remaining in dispute. He took the view that it was not his rôle to "split" the différences between the parties. He also announced that he would make no effort to médiate the outstanding matters because he thought it was inappropriate to do so in an arbitration and because every possible médiation device had been unsuccessfully inflicted on the parties in any event. Mr. Justice Dubin's resulting award is an important décision in interest arbitration decision-making but it reveals that even a brilliant jurist is unable to overcome the imprécision that afflicts decision-making criteria in this area. Bill 1, the back-to-work législation, did not provide any criteria 62 and the learned Justice noted that there did not appear to be any uniformity over the criteria that had been used in past arbitrations dealing with employées in the public sector. Accordingly, he constructed his own yardsticks which included the foliowing considérations Justice DUBIN, March 3, 1976, at pp. 22-23. Teacher-school board collective bargaining is significant in Ontario because it demonstrates the capacity of an essential service to function in a right-to-strike context. It also demonstrates a pragmatic style of government in respect to labour relations, tailoring législative solutions to the needs of particular parties.
CONCLUSION
Against this background it would be rash to attempt to characterize the ethos of compulsory arbitration in Ontario in a word or a phrase. The theoretical debate is not dispositive and more philosophical justifications for compulsory arbitration hâve had their impact on a "hit-and-miss" basis as interest group pressures hâve been brought to bear on the political process. Logical explanations are, at times, difficult to corne by. It can be seen that weaker groups of employées are becoming increasingly in favour of compulsory arbitration as are various scientific and professional employées. This raises the gênerai policy question of whether interest arbitration ought to be available to any employer or trade union who so elects to go this route. First contract arbitration is an interesting mid-way position.
There also exists a relatively high degree of satisfaction with compulsory interest arbitration by those employées in Ontario who are subject to the process. Indeed, one study examining THe Hospital Labour Disputes Act 64 found that sixty-six percent of the people that belonged to unions seemed satisfied with the disposition made by arbitrators and seventy-five percent of their management counterparts indicated satisfaction. In addition, there can be little doubt that compulsory arbitration has had the desired effect of reducing the number of strikes. Against ail of this it can be seen that the cases for and against the use of interest arbitration are mixed and essentially dépend on timing, context and attitude.
Interest arbitration is, however, a blunt and conservative instrument. Solutions to complex problems are not easily achieved and breakthrough bargaining is unsuited to it. Arbitration also tends to be a labour market leveler sometimes producing wage compression conflict between various groups of employées. The process also insulates collective bargaining in the public sector from the legitimate claims of other interest groups who are excluded from participating in décisions which impact on them. At least in a free collective bargaining régime thèse interests can try to influence the employer (i.e. Government) who is politically accountable for its action. But none of this is to deny that there is little évidence interest arbitration has had a significant économie impact over and above what free collective bargaining has incurred; that it has reduced the incidence of strike action; and that its présence may actually hâve encouraged the spread of collective bargaining throughout the ranks of salaried professional, technical and clérical employées. Ail of which leaves us with the problem we set out to addressthat of "detecting (appropriate) policy'*.
